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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
statement of the Problem

Court reform is a growing national priority.

The overwhelm

ing number of litigants populating American courtrooms today has
placed a serious burden upon judicial institutions to produce
well-thought, reasoned decisions in light of a rapidly increasing
caseload.

This caseload growth has restricted judges from fully

effectuating their duties.

Consequently, efforts to accommodate

the growing demand for judicial services reflect a deviation from
the traditional role and responsibilities of the American judge.
For the United states judicial system, such a departure from
tradition has dangerous and potentially irreversible implica
tions.

Immediate action must be taken to prevent any serious

ramifications from arising.

Purpose of the study

It is the purpose of this study to examine the nature, the
scope and the consequences of the caseload problem as well as the
attempts which have been made to improve the situation.

Addi

tionally, a proposal based on the research findings of this paper
will be advanced in an attempt to alleviate the caseload dilemma.
1
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Scope of the Study

It is the intention of this study to deal exclusively with
the federal appellate level.

Two reasons exist.

First, the

federal appellate courts, in particular the Courts of Appeals,
have been affected the most by the caseload growth.

Second, the

function of the appellate courts is distinct from that of the
district courts and needs to be preserved.

Appellate process

requires time for research, reflection and the writing of opin
ions.

In order for these conditions to remain, the proper

environment must exist.

The rising number of cases filed annual

ly at the appellate level increases judicial workload and subse
quently threatens this ideal environment.

Since the appellate

level is the final stage in the litigation process, the need

~or

quality and confidence in judicial services is of extreme impor
tance.

For these reasons, the scope of this study will focus

solely on the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court.

Limitations of the Study

The majority of the data obtained for this study carne
from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
Although some of the data was easily accessible, statistics
concerning more specialized information were more difficult to
obtain.

Consequently, analysis of the data may be restricted to

specific time periods because of limited access to information.

3

Definition of Terms

The following terms are defined to facilitate understanding
of the subject matter:

Case Filing:

Any action that is reported as filed, terminated or

pending in the Administrative Office of the United states Courts.
For this study, case filings will be assessed on a per year basis
where "year" refers to the appellate court term from September
until July.

In Forma Pauperis:

Describes permission given to an indigent to

proceed without liability for court fees or cost. 1

Jurisdiction:

The power of a court to hear and to determine a

judicial proceeding. 2

Writ of Certiorari:

An order which has the effect of ordering

the lower court to certify the record and to send it up to the
higher court which has used its discretion to hear the appeal. 3
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CHAPTER II
THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM
Introduction

The foundation of the federal court system resides in
Article III, Section I of the United States Constitution which
mandates that the judicial power of the Federal Government shall
be vested in "one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.,,4
This constitutional authorization for Congress to develop and to
shape the judicial branch of the federal government has been
instrumental in creating and in attempting to maintain a
tional and effective federal court system.

func~

Accordingly, changes

in the court system's structure and jurisdiction have occurred.

Structural Development

Today, federal

judicial power is not only vested in one

supreme court but also in several inferior appellate and trial
tribunals.

Structurally, the present United States court system

resembles a pyramid.

At the apex, there exists the Supreme

Court, the highest tribunal in the United states which consists
of eight associate justices and one chief justice.

The United

states Courts of Appeals preside immediately below the Supreme
4
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Court with each court occupying one of thirteen circuits.

Eleven

circuits are organized on a regional basis where each encompasses
three or more states.

The District of Columbia has exclusive

jurisdiction for its district.

Finally, the Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, located in Washington, D.C., has unique
jurisdiction and is not regional in nature.

Between six and

twenty-eight judges are assigned to a circuit depending upon the
amount and the complexity of judicial work involved. S

Overall,

there are presently 156 circuit judges within the twelve courts
of appeals and an additional twelve in the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. 6

Below the.courts of appeals are ninety

four district courts where cases are originally heard and decid
ed.

Eighty-nine of those courts are located in the fifty states

and the other five exist in the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands.
Today, there are 575 district judgeships authorized by law.?
A series of legislative enactments has transformed the
federal

judiciary into the complex, three-tiered system that it

is today.

The Judiciary Act of 1789 was the first major legisla

tive proposal concerning the judicial branch to be approved by
the First Congress.

This act established two tiers of inferior

courts to exist and to function below the Supreme Court.

The

district courts were designated as exclusive trial courts whereas
the intermediate circuit courts, composed of two Supreme Court
justices and one district judge, were given trial and appellate
responsibilities. S

Since the circuits were organized on a geo

6

graphical basis, the concept of "circuit-riding" evolved as the
justices traveled great distances to preside over their
designated circuits.
The majority of legislation has been directed at the
creation and the reform of the middle tier. 9

Until technology

shortened the time involved in traveling, congressional reform of
the court system was based solely on mitigating the travel
burdens imposed on the circuit-riders.

For instance, Congress

restructured the circuit courts so as to only require a panel of
one justice and one district judge. IO

Congress also opted to

expand the membership of the Supreme Court. ll

Originally, Con

gress resisted such a measure, but as the double duty of circuit
riding and of presiding on the Supreme Court became increasingly
burdensome and as western expansion necessitated the creation Qf
new circuits, this type of reform was inevitable.
From 1870 to 1891 such factors as geographical expansion,
population growth, commercial development and congressional
extensions of federal

jurisdiction precipitated a dramatic

increase in federal litigation.

Consequently, the Circuit Court

of Appeals Act, traditionally known as the Evarts Act, was
enacted.

This act created a circuit court of appeals with

appellate jurisdiction for each of the nine circuits and accord
ingly provided for permanent court of appeals judgeships.12
Although the circuit courts (as distinguished from the Courts of
Appeals in the nine circuits) remained, further cHange was made
in 1911 which completely abolished the circuit courts and trans
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ferred their trial jurisdiction to the district courts. 13

Fi

nally, in 1925, Congress expanded the Supreme Court's discretion
over its docket. 14

Essentially, these legislative reforms

created the present structure of the federal court system where
the district courts have exclusive trial responsibilities, the
Courts of Appeals exist for petitioners to assert their right of
appeal and the Supreme Court exercises final review at its
discretion on matters of public and national importance.
Although the structure has not changed drastically since the
early 1900s, modifications in the geographical design of the
Courts of Appeals have occurred.
added. 15

In 1929, a tenth circuit was

Moreover, by implementing the 1948 Judicial Code,

Congress created the District of Columbia circuit and technically
renamed the Courts of Appeals circuits as the Courts of Appeals
for the Various Circuits. 16

In 1981, the court of Appeals for

the Eleventh Circuit was created,17 and the Court of Appeals for
the Federal circuit was established in 1982 under the Federal
Courts Improvement Act. 18

This circuit, merging the courts of

customs, patents and claims appeals, is a specialized (rather
than regional) court which handles all judicial business regard
ing patents, trademarks, international trade, and claims against
the federal government. 19

•
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Jurisdictional Development

Article III, section II of the United states Constitution
broadly defines the federal court system's jurisdiction.

That

is, the United states courts can decide only those cases where
the Constitution has given the courts the authority to do so.
Accordingly,

jurisdiction extends to those cases or controversies

where the United states government is a party, where two or more
states or citizens from different states are parties to an
action, where ambassadors or other public ministers or consuls
are involved, or where maritime and admiralty matters merit
judicial attention. 20
With respect to the Supreme Court, the Constitution grants
original jurisdiction (the authority to consider and to decide
cases in the first instance) as well as appellate jurisdiction
(the authority to review a decision or judgment of an inferior
tribunal and to affirm, reverse or modify the decision).

Where

cases or controversies involve ambassadors or other public
ministers or consuls, the Supreme Court exercises original
diction.

juris

In all other matters, the Supreme Court primarily has

appellate jurisdiction.
It is important to note that Congress can control the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction by either expanding or
limiting it.

Indeed, the Constitution stipulates that the

Supreme Court's jurisdiction is subject to congressional regula
tions. 2l

Therefore, no inherent right to control

jurisdiction

•
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belongs to the Court.

Major legislative efforts modifying the

Supreme Court's jurisdiction include the Judiciary Act of 1925
which greatly expanded the Court's power of discretion by replac
ing mandatory appeals with petitions for certiorari and the
Judiciary Act of 1928 which mandated that the sole method of
mandatory review was in appeal form.

More recently, in 1988

Congress eliminated substantially all of the Supreme Court's
mandatory, statutory-appeal jurisdiction. 22
The Courts of Appeals for the First through the Eleventh
Circuits and the District of Columbia Circuit have regional
jurisdiction.

That is, they possess the authority to preside

over all cases of any type in a specific region.
Federal Circuit claims special

Conversely, the

jurisdiction, for it has the

authority to consider and to rule on all cases of a particular
type in the nation.

The Courts of Appeals, having no power of

discretion, must review all appeals that are filed.

In contrast

to the appellate jurisdiction of the intermediate courts and the
Supreme Court, the district courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction.

Additions to the Federal Judicial Apparatus

Certain institutions have recently been created to assist
the Federal Judicial Branch in court administration, research and
other responsibilities.

The Administrative Office of the United

States Courts performs many of the support functions of the
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federal court system.

Among its many responsibilities, the

Administrative Office prepares and submits to Congress the budget
and legislative agenda for the courts, provides administrative
assistance to court personnel and clerical staffs, compiles and
publishes statistics on the volume and distribution of the
business of the courts and conducts research concerning court
procedure and reform. 23

The United states Judicial Conference,

the policy-making arm of the Federal Judiciary, consists of the
Chief Justice of the United states, the Chief Judges of the
Courts of Appeals and twelve district judges chosen for a three
year term.

Twice a year the Conference convenes and discusses

administrative problems, policy issues and recommendations for
legislation affecting the federal judicial system. 24

Finally,

in 1968 Congress created the Federal Judicial Center to conduct
research and training programs for judges and court personnel.
Essentially, the Federal Judicial Center is the research and
development arm of the Federal Judiciary.25

These institutions

have proven to be valuable and effective adjuncts of the Federal
Judicial Branch.

CHAPTER III
THE DILEMMA AT THE APPELLATE LEVEL
Introduction

The volume of case filings flooding the appellate level
of the United states court system presents a dangerous predica
ment.

The function of the appellate courts is distinct from that

of the trial courts.

Indeed, the study Group on the Caseload of

the Supreme Court emphasizes that the appellate function is a
"process" over a period of time which resides "at the opposite
pole from the 'processing' of cases in a high-speed, high volume
enterprise [such as the district courts]. ,,26

In defining the

role of the appellate courts, the Study Group asserts that the
vital conditions for the discharge of the appellate level's
responsibilities is "adequate time and ease of mind for research,
reflection, [clarification] and consultation in reaching a judg
ment. ,,27

The enormous increase in cas e f i 1ings compromises

these indispensable conditions to the extent that the integrity
of the appellate level and its work is jeopardized.

This is the

appellate dilemma.
The inability of court authorities, scholars and researchers
to establish definitive causes of the caseload growth further
heightens the problem.

Changes in the population, in legisla

tion, in the size of the legal profession and in the social,
11
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economic and political environment have immensely affected the
caseload growth.

However, no specific source can be singled out

as the primary cause of the caseload explosion.

Court of Appeals

Judge Richard Posner, author of The Federal Courts:

Crisis and

Reform, suggests that expanding the federal rights of an
individual has a profound impact upon caseload growth.

He

remarks, "Increasing the number of potential claims by expanding
an individual's federal rights has shifted the demand curve for
the federal

judicial services outward. ,,28

Such a claim would

correspond with the litigation boom of the 1960s, a decade
replete with federal civil rights legislation such as the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and with court decisions supporting fundamen
tal, individual rights such as Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335
(1963) .
Former Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice of the
United States, Mark W. Cannon also theorizes as to causality.

He

contends that population growth has played a major role in the
caseload increase.

As people grow and develop into a complex

society, more conflicts will arise resulting in litigation.
Likewise, a change in the American public's attitude has oc
curred.

Americans seem more apt to turn to the courts as a first

resort.

Consequently, the federal

judiciary many times must

contend with frivolous litigation claims.
A sudden and considerable growth in the legal profession in
the 1970s has contributed to the mounting caseload.

The emer

gence of young, ambitious litigators accommodated and perpetuated

13
the high demand for litigation as opportunity for legal services
increased.

Also, a new emphasis in the law schools toward

advocacy may have improved the problem of inadequate representa
tion in the courtroom but also has boosted case filings as the
young lawyers become more confident in their advocacy skills. 29
with all of these factors influencing the American environ
ment at different times, it is difficult to pinpoint one specific
cause.

Moreover, Richard Posner concludes that since no one

seems to have a very clear idea of the causes of the caseload
increase, it is extremely difficult to predict with any confi
dence future growth and subsequently effective solutions. 30
Thus, the recent efforts of researchers have been directed at
surveying and analyzing the case filings of the federal courts in
an attempt to locate specific, substantial areas of increase

~nd

to proceed from there.

Establishing the Caseload Increase

The Supreme Court. Over the years, the Supreme Court's case
filings have increased in number.

During the early 1900s, annual

filings were estimated at around 565 cases.

By the middle of the

1900s between 1,000 and 2,000 case filings were reported. 31

In

1989, 5,000 cases were filed at the Supreme Court of which 63%
came from the federal courts. 32

Thus, since the beginning of

the 1900s, a considerable increase in case filings per year has
occurred.

Close analysis of this growth suggests a significant
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rise in the percentage of annual filings in the 1960s, then a
more constant percentage increase during the 1970s and the 1980s
(See Table 1 and Figure 1).

Table 1

SUPREME COURT CASE FILINGS FROM 1920-1990

YEAR

ANNUAL CASE
FILINGS

PERCENTAGE OF
INCREASE IN ANNUAL
CASE FILINGS

--

1920

565

1930

1092

93%

1940

1109

2%

1950

1321

19%

1960

2296

74%

1970

3500

53%

1980

4135

18%

1990

5000

21%

Source:

Computed from data submitted by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts
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FIGURE 1: Case Filings of the Supreme Court from 1920-1990
Source: Computed from data submitted by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts
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The Courts of Appeals.

The increase in annual case filings for

the Supreme Court, dramatic as it is, is dwarfed by the increase
in the number of Courts of Appeals case filings.

The Annual

Report by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts reveals that for the 1989 term the Courts of
Appeals received 34,995 case filings. 33

Again, a complete exam

ination of the Courts of Appeals annual case filings from 1890
1990 indicates a dramatic and continuous increase (See Table 2
and Figure 2).

In fact, within a ten-year span beginning in

1960, case filings for the Courts of Appeals increased by 204
percent.

In comparison, examination of the decade prior to 1960

revealed only a 41 percent increase whereas analysis of the 1940
1950 era uncovers a 22 percent decrease in case filings.

Addi

tionally, in breaking down the case filings into their respective
circuits, it is evident that over the past ten years the largest
number of case filings has come from the Ninth and Fifth Circuits
whereas the lowest number has emanated from the District of
Columbia and the First Circuit (See Table 3).

•
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Table 2
CASE FILINGS FOR THE COURTS OF APPEALS FROM 1890-1990
YEAR

CASE
FILINGS

PERCENTAGE
INCREASE

NUMBER OF
JUDGES

FILINGS
PER JUDGE

1890

841

--

II

77

1900

1093

30%

25

44

1910

1672

53%

30

56

1920

1523

9%

34

45

1930

2874

89%

45

64

1940

3446

20%

55

63

1950

2678

-22%

64

42

1960

3765

41%

66

57

1970

11440

204%

90

127

1980

23155

102%

120

193

1990

34995

51%

168

208

Source: Computed from data submitted by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts
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FIGURE 2:
Sourr.e:

The Court of Appeals Case Filings from 1890-1990
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Computed from ~ata submitted by the Administrative
Office of the United states Courts
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Table 3
U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS CASE LOAD BY CIRCUIT, 1980-89
CIRCUIT /

YEAR

'80

'81

'82

'83

'84

'85

'86

'87

'88

'89

1

688

761

903

825

966

950

1090

1035

1151

1175

2

1829

2608

2388

2352

2541

2455

2600

2705

2668

2908

3

1659

1600

1850

2164

2137

2236

2191

2274

2652

2776

4

1981

1943

2390

2140

2058

2489

2493

2632

2766

2913

5

3682

4229

2317

2777

3120

3094

3349

3828

3859

4362

6

1823

2016

2265

2438

2599

2737

3237

3425

3467

3754

7

1544

1717

1820

2072

1986

1940

2007

1923

2163

2416

8

975

1156

1405

1492

1609

1815

1842

2035

2150

2477

9

2928

3288

3443

3568

4043

4258

4351

4790

5571

5450

10

1228

1351

1537

1557

1638

1695

1715

1705

1768

1884

11

---

---

2326

2818

3205

3620

3617

3578

3648

4006

DC

922

722

907

836

704

1271

933

868

823

874

Source:

*

Computed from data submitted by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts

No data was available for the annual case filings of the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
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Analysis of Case Filings*

It becomes apparent that the period between 1958 and 1962
represents a turning point for the caseload of the Supreme Court
and the Courts of Appeals (Figure 3).

In the past ten years the

total civil case filings for the Courts of Appeals clearly
outnumber the total criminal case filings (See Figure 4).

Of

those civil matters, private cases including mostly federal
questions and diversity of citizenship matters constitute approx
imately 70 percent of the civil caseload.

The other 30 percent

consists of public law matters where the government is a party to
the cause of action.

Such percentages for the Courts of Appeals

have remained constant throughout the ten-year span from 1980.
Additionally, areas that seem to indicate a substantial
burden for the Courts of Appeals include civil rights, diversity
of citizenship, tax suits and social security laws.

The Ninth

Circuit, over the past ten years, has carried the highest caseload with the Fifth and the Eleventh Circuits also having a
substantial amount of judicial business.

Conversely, the lowest

number of case filings exist at the District of Columbia Circuit
and the First Circuit.
*

Analysis of the data submitted by the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts
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FIGURE 3:

Comparison Between the Annual Case Filings of the Courts of Appeals
and The Supreme Court from 1890-1990
Source: Computed from data submitted by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts
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With respect to the Supreme Court, over a ten-year span
beginning in 1980 approximately 50 percent of the filed petitions
on writ of certiorari have concerned private civil matters while
40 percent have been of a criminal nature.

However, only approx

imately 9 percent of the petitions involving criminal cases are
actually granted.

The highest percentage of cases granted in a

particular area are private civil cases which involve constitu
tional questions and a number of taxation matters.

Around 4

percent of administrative appeals are filed with the Supreme
Court.

However, of those cases 8 percent are actually granted

and decided on the merits.

David O'Brien, Professor of Political

Science at the University of Virginia, recently found the follow
ing subject areas represented in the written opinions issued by
the Court:

Constitutional (56%), Taxation (18.9%), Statutory,

(15.1%), Administrative (9%), and Criminal (4%).34

Measuring the Workload Increase

Judicial caseload is not always comparable to judicial
workload.

As Richard Posner maintains, "A case is not a standard

measurement like a quart or a constant inflation-free dollar.,,35
If an increase in case filings were associated with a decrease in
the difficulty of the average case, the figures on caseload
growth would exaggerate the actual increase in the workload of
the courts.

Likewise, a stabilization or a decrease in caseload

coupled with an increase in the complexity of the average case

•
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would disguise the severity of the caseload/workload crisis.
Hence, figures on case filings cannot be solely relied upon to
validate the caseload/workload crisis.
However, much evidence exists indicating that the
statistics accurately reflect the increased workload of the
appellate courts.

Such evidence can be found by considering the

mounting backlog that exists in the appellate courts, the number
of appellate terminations after hearing or submission, the
increased reliance of a judge on his support and legal staffs,
the growing complexity of a case's subject matter and the mount
ing concern for this crisis expressed by the appellate judges and
justices.

Such findings, when taken together, offer compelling

reasons to assert that the caseload figures accurately illustrate
a case overload in the appellate courts and an unendurable work
load for the appellate justices.

The Courts of Appeals.

There are presently 25,930 cases that

are pending on appeal in the Courts of Appeals circuits. 36
Those cases that are "pending" have not been acted upon during
the year for which they were granted, and consequently an accumu
lation of cases over the years exist.

The Ninth Circuit consist

ing of Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands
has the largest backlog with the Fifth and the Eleventh Circuits
close behind. 37

This backlog coupled with the 34,995 cases

filings for this past term suggest an enormous burden on the

•
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appellate courts when attempting to fulfill their unique respon
sibilities.
Another way to measure workload as distinct from raw case
load is to examine the number of terminations on the merits, that
is, the number of terminations after court consideration and
judgment on a particular case.

Case terminations before these

stages in the appellate process require less time.

Thus, an

increase in the number of cases that are heard in an official
manner or are submitted for consideration to a panel of judges
reflects an increase in the amount of work a judge must perform.
In 1960 the total number of terminations after hearing or submis
sion came to 2,681 cases out of an overall 3,713 terminations 38
whereas in 1989 the terminations on the merits totaled 19,322
cases 39 .

In terms of percentage, the number of terminations

after oral arguments or submission has increased by 621 percent
since 1960.
Additionally, the considerable increase in the length of the
opinions issued by the Courts of Appeals and in the length of
footnotes and citations included within those opinions suggest
that a considerable amount of time is invested in opinion writ
ing--an exclusive appellate function.

Again, over a span of

twenty-five years beginning in 1960, the length of the Courts of
Appeals' opinions nearly doubled. 40

Moreover, considerable evi

dence exists to relate this increase in the length of opinions
and in the number of footnotes and citations to a greater com
plexity in a case's subject matter. 41

Indeed, Judge Patricia
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Wald, currently serving on the District of Columbia Circuit,
remarks, "Another important change in at least the D.C. Circuit's
caseload is the increasingly technical, complex nature of subject
matter.,,42

Such cases not only have subject matters that are

complicated and specialized but also involve records with thou
sands of pages, multiple issues, and numerous parties all of
which require judicial attention and contribute significantly to
the judge's burdensome workload.
Finally, specific Courts of Appeals judges have expressed
concern over the growing burden placed upon them by the caseload
increase.

Richard Posner contends that the appellate system is

"on the verge of being radically changed for the worse under the
pressure of the rapid and unremi t ting growth in casel oad. ,,43
Posner goes on to predict a deterioration in the federal court
system if reforms are not immediately implemented.

Additionally,

D.C. Circuit Judge Patricia Wald, emphasizes that a federal
appellate court has no control over the total number of docketed
cases as is the case for the Supreme Court, for every rejected
litigant in the district court has the right to appeal a final
order once.

She indicates that this, in effect, places a heavier

burden upon the intermediate appellate courts and predicts that
"heavier caseloads and increasingly complex subject matter are
surely here to stay.,,44

Wald concludes that in order for the

appellate level to survive this deluge of cases a concentrated
effort must be made toward acknowledging the essence of the
judicial role, preserving it, and making adjustments in light of

I
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it.

Essentially, all of these viewpoints stem from the over

whelming concern generated by statistical findings and judicial
observations that the conditions necessary for the successful
functioning of the appellate level do not exist and will not in
the future unless immediate and effective measures are taken.

The Supreme Court.

Capturing the essence of the caseload problem

Justice John Paul Stevens remarks, "We are too busy to decide
whether there is anything we can do about the problem of being
too busy. ,,45

Indeed, all of the justices agree that there ex

ists a serious problem in need of resolution.

Such a problem not

only includes the work demands placed upon the justices but also
the lack of time to formulate and to implement a plan of action
amidst a docket full of complex, diversified cases.

The fact

that all of the justices agree that the increase in caseload for
their Court accurately reflects an increase in their workload is
persuasive in substantiating the workload dilemma.

However,

other indications of a heightened workload exist and are worth
examining.
First, since the litigation boom in the 1960s, there has
been a substantial decrease in the number of granted petitions
for review on writ of certiorari.

Prior to this caseload growth,

the Supreme Court maintained a 17.5 percentage rate for the
number of petitions for review on writ of certiorari that it
granted.

Conversely, by the late 1980s, only 5.7 percent of the

petitions from the federal courts were granted.

On a larger
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scale, over the last ten years the Court has received from the
federal courts 27,370 petitions for review on writ of certiorari
of which 90 percent were denied and 4 percent were dismissed.
Hence, only 6 percent of the petitions that have come to the
Supreme Court for review on writ of certiorari over the past ten
years have been granted. The following table displays this
decrease in the percentage of petitions:

Table 3
PERCENTAGE OF PETITIONS FOR REVIEW ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
THAT HAVE BEEN GRANTED BY THE SUPREME COURT

YEAR

NUMBER OF
PETITIONS

1940

951

166

17.5%

1950

1017

113

11.1%

1960

1899

141

7.4%

1970

3286

317

9.6%

1980

2433

139

5.7%

1990

3166

182

5.7%

Source:

NUMBER OF
PETITIONS
GRANTED

I

PERCENTAGE
OF
PETITIONS

Computed from data submitted by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts

Justice John Paul Stevens further remarked that the Court is
now processing more litigation and granting more petitions for
review on writ of certiorari than ever before (Table 3).46

An

increase in case filings and an increase in the number of peti
tions for review that the Court has granted, coupled with a de-
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crease in the percentage of petitions that have been granted,
strongly suggests that the justices simply cannot keep pace with
the workload the case filings are creating.

Further, Justice

stevens admits that he does not have the time to look at the
petitions in over 80 percent of the cases that are filed. 47
Consequently, it is the responsibility of stevens'

law clerks to

review these cases and select a small minority of petitions that
the clerks believe Justice Stevens would have selected himself.
stevens concludes that the other members of the Court with the
exception of Justice Brennan also follow this practice. 48
In support of this contention, David O'Brien, author of
storm Center, also acknowledges the Supreme Court's tendency to
rely heavily on its law clerks' recommendations when voting on
petitions in conference. 49

O'Brien additionally offers statis

tics demonstrating that only in rare occasions do the justices
deviate from the recommendations of their clerks. 50

Posner also

explores this reliance of the justices upon their law clerks.

In

a special section titled "The Rise of the Law Clerk", Posner
devotes a significant amount of time examining the role of the
law clerk.

Posner emphasizes that the law clerks not only

inherit a degree of influence in assuming the justices' screening
responsiblities but also play an active role in the writing of
opinions.

Of significant interest, Posner points out that every

few years the style and the tone of the justices' opinions
change.

He contends that it is no coincidence that this periodic

change corresponds with the average length of a law clerk's
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term. 51

On the whole, much evidence exists to indicate that the

justices are overburdened and, out of necessity, must delegate
specific responsibilities to court personnel.
The amount of time invested in writing an opinion which
reverses a lower court's decision naturally requires more judi
cial time and reflection since the judge must provide solid
reasons for reversal.

Accordingly, O'Brien reports an increasing

reversal rate in the number of Supreme Court decisions overruled
by the Court and in the number of congressional acts over
turned. 52

This reversal rate is intensified by the current

shifting in judicial philosophy among the Court as the Reagan
appointments begin to gain influence on the Court.

Whereas the

Court has an increased tendency toward reversal, it also is
becoming more divided in its philosophies and in response to very
complex, controversial cases that merit judicial attention.
Consequently, separate opinions (whether concurring or dissent
ing) are more often the norm than the exception.
All of these developments in the Supreme Court indicate the
growing difficulty for the justices to adequately function when
up against the challenge of managing its inflating docket.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in the "1989 Year-End Report on the
Federal Judiciary," emphasizes that the increasing volume of
cases is only part of the problem facing the courts today. "The
nature of the caseload is also becoming more burdensome ... Complex
cases that require extensive judicial time now represent a
greater portion of the overall caseload. ,,53

Justice Harry

I
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Blackmun also expresses concern over the caseload growth and the
threat it poses to the appellate process.

For him, experience

dictates that the heavier the caseload, the less possibility of
proper performance and adjudication.

He concludes, "The Nation,

in my opinion, deserves bet ter than this. ,,54

Examining the Consequences

Recently, Justice stevens remarked that the unwieldy flow of
litigation "is having a more serious impact on the administration
of justice than is generally recognized.,,55

Additionally,

Former Chief Justice Burger asserts, "The work of the Supreme
Court of the United states will breakdown or deteriorate in
quality so that its historic role will not be performed adequate
1y. ,,56

Such predicti ons of fered by these Supreme Court jus t ices

suggest the severity of the consequences arising from the appel
late caseload dilemma.
Bureaucratization of the federal appellate system is a
concern of many judicial researchers and members of the legal
profession while others remain unaffected by the thought of it.
Court of Appeals Judge Patricia Wald concedes that the federal
court system hardly operates as a bureaucratic hierarchy. "Ver
tically, district to circuit, circuit to Supreme Court, the
federal judiciary does not function in the hierarchical fashion
of a typical bureaucracy. ,,57

However, Richard Posner, defining

a bureaucracy as "a large, organization tenuously held together

32

by paper," views most of the federal courts in a bureaucratic
sense. 58

Although the federal courts structurally may not re

semble a bureaucratic institution, certain specific character
istics of a bureaucracy exist.
First, there has been an enormous expansion in the number
of federal appellate judges and their support staff.

As indicat

ed in Table 2, only eleven judges presided on the Courts of
Appeals in 1890 whereas 126 judges exist today.

A proliferation

of supporting personnel within court chambers and an emphasis on
managerial practices and modern office technology also hint at a
bureaucratic emergence.

Much of this was initiated by Chief

Justice Burger who introduced office technology and a more
complex internal structure within the court chambers to promote
efficiency,
Joseph Vining, Professor of Law at University of Michigan,
remarks that the structure of the courts is becoming much too
complicated as he has witnessed the emergence of "layers" in the
staffs of the law clerks and administrative assistants. 59

David

O'Brien observes that the justices have acquired more clerks,
more on-staff attorneys, and more secretarial personnel.

Fur

ther, the court's administrative assistant staff has become more
professional and involved in the court's workload. GO

Likewise,

the Federal Judicial Center, the United states Judicial Confer
ence (referred to as the "right arm of the jUdiciary") and the
Administrative Office of the United states Courts can also be
viewed as important extensions of the Federal Judiciary which add
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to the numbers populating this branch of the Federal Government.
More frequent communication among the judges through written
memoranda as opposed to personal one-to-one conferences repre
sents another bureaucratic dimension.

Court of Appeals Judge

Alvin Rubin argues that such a lack of verbal communication
decreases the collegiality among justices--an important element
in the appellate function. 61

In effect, the judges or justices

are becoming more isolated and unaccountable as well as less
sociable.

This can serve as a detriment to the appellate func

tion in which an essential part rests on collegial discussion of
and reflection on certain areas of law.
Another major consequence of the caseload/workload increase
is a growing non-uniformity in the Courts of Appeals' decisions.
To cope with the volume of cases, the Courts of Appeals must
combine to form hundreds of revolving, unpredictable three-judge
decisional units.

This consequently leads to non-uniformity.

Daniel Meador, Professor of Law at University of Virginia, claims
that regional organization where non-uniformity in decisions can
germinate is a source of increasing problems.

He continues to

acknowledge that "the potential for decisional disharmony today
is even greater than the existence of sixty-five different courts
would suggest.,,62
uniform.

In principle, the application of law must be

Hence, non-uniformity can not only create confusion in

the legal arena but also instill a degree of distrust in a
specific law or, more broadly, in the people's overall under
standing of the law and its purpose.

Prior measures to reduce
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the chance of non-uniformity among the Courts of Appeals were to
hold mandatory judicial conferences where confusion in the
application of a specific law would be resolved through discus
sion among the justices.
However, with an increase in judicial workload and a growing
complexity in case subject-matter, judges and justices have found
it extremely difficult to hold and to attend enough conferences
to make substantial progress with this problem.
Another repercussion of the caseload/workload dilemma is the
change in the judge's role and his responsiblities.

Chief

Justice William Rehnquist in an address delivered to the American
Bar Association recalled that in the 1950s a federal appeals
judgeship was commonly thought of as a "dignified form of semi
retirement".63

A federal appeals judgeship today is an extrem.e

deviation from that described by Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Indeed, as the judge has had to delegate his traditional
responsiblities and assume more court/case management functions,
he, in effect, has been transformed from a jurist to an adminis
trator and from a draftsman to an editor (with respect to his
opinion-writing responsibility). Such a role change has presented
judgeships as less attractive positions for which to strive. 64
Essentially, this could jeopardize the quality of the judicial
product arising out of the federal appeals courts.
The diminished quality of federal appellate services is one
of the most serious consequences.
this condition.

Several factors contribute to

First, today there exists only limited opportu
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nity for complete appellate review.

Whereas the Courts of

Appeals must hear all cases that come before it, the Supreme
Court, having discretionary review, grants annually only 5
percent of the petitions which come to it.

Essentially, the

title of "court of last resort", traditionally associated with
the Supreme Court, can be transferred to the Courts of Appeals
since they are basically the last step in the litigation process
for the litigants.
The reduction of time allotted for oral argument also
diminishes the quality of judicial services because argument is
such an integral part of the appellate function.

In 1848, the

Court began reducing the time involved in oral argument.
1848, unlimited time for oral arguments existed.

Before

The 1848 rule

limited oral arguments to eight hours per case; subsequently, in
1871 the time length was reduced again to four hours per case.
By 1911 the two parties in the case were limited to an hour and a
half, and in 1970 the justices were persuaded by Chief Justice
Burger to further shorten oral arguments to thirty minutes per
side. 55

Proponents of oral arguments, one of which is Court of

Appeals Judge Patricia Wald, contend that much value resides in
the concept of oral argument.

"Oral argument places the

decision-maker face-to-face with the contestants and gives what
is often a remote and abstract legal system an important human
character. ,,66

Addi tionall y, she asserts that a judge wi 11 ap

proach a case in a different manner when oral arguments are
involved because of the opportunity to question and to conduct
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discussion with the counsel litigating the case.

Even in the

Courts of Appeals, oral arguments are now limited to only 50
percent of the cases. 67

Thus, in the words of Judge Wa 1d, "Oral

argument is a vi tal but endangered species. ,,68
Not only are there increasingly limited opportunities for
complete appellate review but also skepticism as to the authority
of opinions drafted by law clerks rather than the judges and
justices themselves. Joseph Vining stresses that the legal
profession's ultimate source of primary authority resides in the
opinions of the Supreme Court.

Indeed, these opinions are "the

text of choice for American 1egal anal ysis. ,,69

He deems these

opinions as unauthored and patched together by support personnel
in the center of a bureaucratic environment.

Thus, a waning

respect for and trust in the Supreme Court's authority as ex
pressed through the Supreme Court's most valuable instrument--the
opinion--can prove to be dangerous and potentially irreversible
in the future if changes are not made.
Justice Stevens predicts that the problem of court delay
will be a serious consequence of the caseload/workload in
crease. 70

Thus, not only will the appellate courts have to

contend with increasing caseloads but also the accumulation of
pending cases.

As a result, it will be inevitable that those

cases having the most importance will receive the attention of
the justices whereas matters of secondary importance will be put
aside or delegated to the members of the judge's support staff.
The most profound consequence of the appellate dilemma is
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the changing public perception of the federal court system and,
more broadly, the concept of justice.

Certainly, the appellate

level's inability to function properly and effectively lessens
the value of its services.

Consequently, Jethro K. Lieberman,

author of The Litigious Society concludes that Americans may be
litigating more, but they are increasingly becoming less satis
fied. 71

Additionally, Joseph Vining asserts with concern that

there exists "a sense among serious analysts that the Supreme
Court is failing them. ,,72

He continues by stating that these

rather harsh complaints are also accompanied by a more general
tone. of commentary which indicates a growing disrespect for and
lack of faith in the internal workings of the present federal
judicial system.

In an article entitled "Generic Justice",

Howard A. Specter, former President of the American Bar Associ
ation, asserts that an increasingly high number of people are
viewing the concept of justice and the value of court
services as a product "to be labeled, marked down, weighed and
bagged at the 1oca 1 supermarket". 73

Hence, he cha 11 enges soci

ety and members of the legal profession to rediscover the humane
aspect of the law which in itself allows the legal system to be
treated more delicately than a bureaucratic institution.

The

disintegration of law and its authority is a real and immediate
concern for the nineties.
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CHAPTER IV
REFORMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction

This chapter deals specifically with the reforms and the
recommendations that have been advanced in an effort to resolve
the caseload dilemma.

While some reforms have occurred, those

changes have had only a short term effect on the caseload.
Indeed, within a few years of the reforms, the case filings esca
lated to a higher number than before the change took place. 74
There exists a need for the type of reform which will be long
range and highly effective when applied.

Reforms

Technological innovation has been one of the reforms imple
mented over the past fifteen to twenty years.

Such changes have

accelerated the processing of the caseload within the judge's
court chamber but have had no effect on the actual workload of
the judge.

Indeed, David O'Brien remarks that although such

technological improvements can have an effect on the internal
structure, there remains the burdensome judicial workload. 75
Another reform that has been relied upon is the creation of
additional judgeships.

However, several arguments have been
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advanced in opposition to such a reform.

The Federal Courts

study Committee, recently created by Congress to examine problems
facing the courts of the United states, stresses that several
problems can arise from the creation of additional

judgeships.

First, a larger judiciary can provoke more conflicting opinions
and uncertainty in the application of law within the circuit or
among the circuits.

Second, as the court becomes larger, so does

the possibility of a diminishing familiarity and collegiality
among the circuit judges.

Third, an increased size of the

judicial branch strains the judicial appointment process which in
effect could allow unqualified candidates to attain judgeships.
Finally, as the judicial institution grows and the judge has less
time for individual contribution, the attractiveness of an
appellate judgeship decreases. 76

Further, J. Woodford Howard,

Jr. states that adding to the number of judges precipitates a
bureaucratic structure.

He remarks that increasing the number of

judges offers a quick fix for small circuits; however, adding
judicial manpower to larger circuits "raises a galaxy of qualita
tive issues concerning the optimum size, number and internal
operating procedures".77

This is not to say that the mere

creation of additional judgeships is not advantageous.
it cannot be the sole reform to be implemented.

However,

Additional

reforms are needed.
Also, numerous changes in jurisdiction, structure and court
procedure have evolved in response to the increased caseload.
Most recently, the appellate courts are now imposing penalties
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for frivolous case filings. 78

Again, these changes have pro

duced only short term effects and have had only a slight impact
on the overall number of case filings.

Recommendations

Daniel Meador, Professor of Law at the University of Virgin
ia, has recommended a restructuring of the United states· Courts
of Appeals by modifying its regional design.

He emphasizes that

"regional organization is the source of increasing problems in
the administration of federal law. ,,79

The most serious probl em

is the non-uniformity among the Courts of Appeals circuits. He
concludes that the potential for "decisional disharmony" is even
greater than imagined.

To resolve this problem Meador advocates

the elimination of the regional design of the Courts of Appeals
and the implementation of non-regional subject matter courts at
the intermediate appellate level.

Essentially, this would

abolish any non-uniformity since the same types of cases would be
heard in one specialized tribunal.
Court of Appeals Judge Patricia Wald strongly opposes such
an idea.

She remarks, "Specialty courts invite domination by the

specia 1i zed bar - - -no one el se unders tands or cares. ,,80

She

further contends that specialized courts tend to take the judges
out of the mainstream of the law and of the legal developments.
Court of Appeals Judge Richard Posner advocates a different
approach rather than specialization. Posner primarily argues for
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judicial self-restraint to compensate for the large number of
federal rights granted to individuals during the 1960s.

In

addition, he urges more institutional rather than individualistic
opinions as well as more legal education with respect to judicial
administration.
Again, Judge Patricia Wald indicates her opposition to such
a proposal. "The heavier caseload in large part reflects better
access to the courts and more legal protections and benefits for
less-favored members of society.

I resist any wholesale surren

der of these hard-fought victories to 'reformers' rallying under
the banner of judicial efficiency."Sl Indeed, Posner seems to
advocate efficiency at the expense of individual rights.
Another major recommendation for court reform is the cre
ation of a National Court of Appeals.

Throughout the years

variations in this concept have occurred.

Thus, three distinct

proposals for a National Court of Appeals now exist.

First, as

endorsed by the Former Chief Justice Warren Burger, a National
Court of Appeals should be created which would be located between
the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court.

This tribunal would

hear those cases referred to it by the Supreme Court.

Therefore,

if the Supreme Court thought a case was worthy of court evalua
tion but did not have time to review it, the case would be given
to the National Court of Appeals.

The Freund Committee of 1972

suggested another variation in this "National Court of Appeals"
concept.

According to the Freund Committee report, a court

sitting between the levels of the Courts of Appeals and the
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Supreme Court would screen all petitions that came to the Supreme
Court and make recommendations on which petitions should be
granted review. 82

Finally, Justice Stevens proposed a third

variation quite similar to that recommended by the Freund Commit
tee.

He advocates the creation of a National Court of Appeals

which not only would be responsible for making recommendations
but also would have the power to decide which cases the Supreme
Court woul d revi ew. 83
However, implications arise from these three variations.
First, the "screening" function is an integral part of the
Supreme Court's power; for, to delegate the screening function
would be to give up a part of the Supreme Court's authority.

The

Constitution mandates that judicial power be vested in one
supreme court. Thus, the constitutionality of this proposed court
is questionable since the court would be assuming one of the
Supreme Court's major functions, the power to determine the
Court's judicial business.

Second, the aim of the Freund propos

al is to relieve the justices of their "screening" responsi
bilities and allow them more time to concentrate on research and
opinion writing.

However, by implementing the Freund committee's

proposal, the justices would still have to perform screening
responsiblities since the proposed court would only have the
power to recommend which petitions for review should be granted.
Finally, if Justice Stevens' recommendation were to be put in
effect, the Supreme Court would never see the petitions for
review or the respective areas of law that the petitions would
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address.

Such a proposal would limit the Supreme Court's power

and cloud its insight into developing areas of law.
Finally, the Federal Courts Study Committee has proposed
several reform alternatives to be considered by the judiciary and
others interested in court reform.

First, it suggests the

elimination of the present Courts of Appeals circuits and the
creation of multiple small circuits consisting of only nine or
ten judges. 84

While the small size might foster an appropriate

environment for judicial deliberation and contemplation, the
restructuring could cause more disharmony in circuit decisions.
Additionally, as the number of case filings continue to increase,
this recommendation could have only a short term effect since no
mechanism for dealing with rising case filings in these small
circuits has been proposed.
The Federal Courts study Committee's second alternative for
court reform is the creation of a four-tier system. 8S

The addi

tional layer would reside in between the Courts of Appeals and
the Supreme Court.

This new layer of four to five new tribunals

would have discretionary review over appeals from the lower
circuits. This alternative could be beneficial if it could
eliminate some of the confusion as to the uniform application of
law in the Courts of Appeals.

However, it is apparent that this

recommendation would merely add another layer to the present
court structure and could potentially contribute to the bureau
cratization of the federal court system.
Finally, the creation of national subject matter courts, as
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supported by Daniel Meador, has been outlined as another alterna
tive by the Federal Courts study Committee.

The committee agrees

that a wide creation of these specialized courts would create
numerous political and organizational issues.

Therefore, only

limited creation of specialized courts are warranted according to
the committee.
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CHAPTER V
PROPOSAL
Introduction

Any proposal for appellate court reform needs to recognize
not only the essential functions of the appellate judge that must
be preserved but also the nature of the case filings that most
severely jeopardize those functions.

A growing trend in techni

cal, complex cases which demand more judicial time, concentration
and resources has occurred throughout the 1980s.

Additionally,

the number of civil cases, in particular those involving private
civil matters, constitute a large portion of the appellate court
docket.

While drug-related criminal case filings are predicted

to clutter the appellate court dockets and take priority over
other cases in the 1990s, the constant and substantial amount of
taxation and social security matters also reflect burdensome
areas for the judges in the upcoming decade.
It is clear that no single, all-encompassing reform will
totally annihilate the appellate court dilemma.

However, a

series of gradual and focused reforms looks promising with
respect to improving the caseload crisis in the federal appellate
courts.

While the caseload burden poses a threat to both levels

of the federal appellate court system, data indicates that it
most significantly impinges on the United States Courts of
45
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Appeals.

With the growing non-uniformity among the Courts of

Appeals circuits, the primary aim of a long-range proposal should
be to ensure public trust and satisfaction in judicial services
through, among other things, the uniform application of law.
Accordingly, I propose the following recommendations:
1.

The creation and/or reallocation of judgeships.

2.

The creation of a u.s. Court of Appeals for Admin
istrative Agencies, a U.S. Court for Tax Appeals
and a U.S. Court for Social Security
Appeals.

3.

The creation of a U.S. Court of Review for
Intercircuit Conflicts.

4.

The creation of an Office of Judicial Impact
Assessment.

For immediate relief,

judgeships should be added to the

Courts of Appeals respective to the needs of each circuit.
The present "case participation per appellate judge" formula used
by the Judicial Conference as a standard for determining an
appropriate number of judgeships to accommodate workload should
be applied at this point.

However, in the next few years, a new

formula sensitive to the difficulty of and time element involved
in particular types of cases needs to be constructed.

The

Federal Judicial Center, the research branch of the Federal
Judiciary, would be responsible for the creation and implementa
tion of such a formula.

A creation of additional

judgeships and

a reallocation of existing ones where necessary will occur after
this formula is developed.

47
Many members of the legal profession as well as researchers
of judicial administration question the effectiveness of merely
adding judgeships to counteract the growing caseload/workload.
Indeed, past experience dictates that the creation of additional
judgeships for the Courts of Appeals circuits has only short term
effects.

However, until a more accurate formula can be con

structed, establishing new judgeships can provide immediate
relief to those circuits that are straining their institutional
capacity.
A recent case study of the Ninth Circuit reveals that al
though the circuit is the largest in the Courts of Appeals with
respect to the number of appellate judgeships and case filings,
notable improvements in the court's performance and uniformity in
decision has occurred. 86

As the Ninth Circuit insists on its

effectiveness 87 , Professor Arthur Hellman who has conducted
research on the question of problems arising from large circuits
looks positively on the current performance of the Ninth Circuit
and regards it as "the harbinger of future appellate courts
rather than as an abnormality. ,,88

It is necessary to note that

the Ninth Circuit has been allowed to experiment with very
specialized reforms which it believes will be effective for the
particular needs of its circuit.

Thus, attached to the proposal

for additional appellate judgeships is the freedom for all of the
Courts of Appeals circuits to implement specialized reforms.
In effect, this provides a mechanism for minimizing the potential
risks involved in increasing the number of judgeships.
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There also exists a need for a limited number of specialized
courts.

The three United states Courts of Appeals for Tax,

Social Security, and Administrative Agency matters would preside
at the same level as the other circuit courts, and direct review
of these courts' decisions would exist.

The creation of these

courts would take many of the complicated, time-consuming cases
away from the regional courts and would place them in specialized
tribunals able to deal effectively and efficiently with such
cases.

of extreme importance, it follows that a greater degree

of uniformity in these areas would exist.
Opponents of this "specialized court" concept present
reasonable and realistic arguments against such a reform.
Indeed, specialization could foster a narrow-minded attitude when
application of law is necessary.

However, the threat of such a

concept to the American judicial system is minimized by the
limited number of specialized tribunals that would be
created.
Additionally, Daniel Meador points out certain areas of law
are ideal for the implementation of this concept.

The types of

cases that are suitable for this type of reform are those cases
that constitute a significant amount of the judge's workload but
are not enough in number to allow that judge to deal coherently
and constructively with that field of law. 89

After much re

search, the creation of these specialized courts seems to be
extremely beneficial to the present appellate court system since
over the last ten years a constant and substantial percentage of
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the appellate caseload involves social security, tax, and admin
istrative agency matters.
The proposal's most significant reform is the creation of a
United states Court of Review for Intercircuit Conflicts.

Such

a court would consist of two divisions with nine permanent judges
sitting en banc in each division.

This court would exist between

the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court.

Mandatory

review for all intercircuit conflicts would exist in addition to
the opportunity to file a petition for writ of certiorari before
the Supreme Court.

One of the divisions would consider cases

specifically involving private civil matters; the other division
would be responsible for conflicts of a criminal or public
nature.

The court would also be in charge of planning and con

ducting judicial conferences for the Courts of Appeals level
(modeled after the Judicial Conference of the United States)
which would be geared toward discussing and improving court
administration and judicial adjudication among the circuits.
The advantage of such a proposal is that uniformity and
public trust in the law would be maintained.

Joseph Vining

indicates that much of the growing dissatisfaction in the judi
cial system stems from the Courts of Appeals'
in applying the law. 90

lack of uniformity

Not only would greater uniformity exist

because of the function of this court, but also discussion of
specific problems in the application of law among the circuits
would be facilitated at the judicial conferences organized by
this court.

Other advantages of this proposal are that the
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prestige and the nature of the position would attract well
qualified judges, and fundamental rights would be secured against
those who advocate judicial restraint as a reform measure.
Finally, an Office of Judicial Impact Assessment, as recom
mended by the Federal Courts study Committee, should be
established.

This office would advise Congress on the impact of

proposed legislation and would offer assistance in drafting
legislation which most likely would lead to litigation. Such an
office would be directed from the Federal Judicial Center.
Charles A. Johnson and Bradley C. Canon, co-authoring the
book Judicial Policies:

Implementation and Impact, emphasize

that although judicial impact assessment theory is still in its
infant stage, there exists a growing recognition of its impor
tance. 91

Increased understanding of the impact of legislation

would most emphatically eliminate several of the statutory case
filings at both the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court; for,
legislative enactments could be worded more wisely and the
statutory intentions could be expressed more clearly.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS

The Judicial Branch of the Federal Government is a unique
institution; for,

technically, it has no power.

In section 78 of

The Federalist Papers Alexander Hamilton points out that as the
executive branch "holds the sword of the community" and the
legislative branch "commands the purse," the judiciary has only
the cogency of its arguments on which to rely.
stricted the federal

This has not re

judiciary from becoming a powerful and

effective institution in society.

However, essential to its

success has been the public trust in and respect for its func
tions, its purpose and its demonstrated past wisdom.

For the

court to continue to be an influential part of society, it must
maintain the public's approval.
The increase in case filings at the federal appellate level
has created an enormous judicial workload for the appellate
judges.

Serious consequences have arisen from judicial efforts

to manage this workload.

The most profound of these is the

public's changing perception of the federal court system and of
the concept of justice.

Indeed, dissatisfaction and distrust in

the appellate courts are becoming more prevalent.
In the "1989 Year-End Report on the Judiciary,"
Justice Rehnquist emphasizes that the federal
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Chief

judiciary is in

•
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trouble.

He believes that if court reforms are not made within

the very near future, the caseload growth will overcome the
judges and justices and trigger a slow destruction of the system.
The proposal advanced in this paper advocates short term as well
as long term reforms which will gradually modify the system and
restore public confidence in it by ensuring uniformity and
quality in judicial services.
Indeed,

judicial reform has become a national priority and

action must be taken.

Daniel Meador, Professor of Law at Univer

sity of Virginia, concludes that Americans have come to a point
where "judicial architects" must return to the drawing board and
modify the present court structure to fit the altered circum
stances of time.

Just as a major reform was necessary in 1891,

it is also necessary as the United states federal court system
approaches 1991.

The challenge to the judiciary of the 1990s

will be the managing of appeals in the federal courts.
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Appendix A
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
CIRCUITS

GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS

NUMBER OF JUDGES

Federal Circuit

United States

Twelve

District of Columbia

District of Columbia

Twelve

First Circuit

Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, Rhode
Island and Puerto Rico

Six

Second Circuit

Connecticut, New York,
and Vermont

Thirteen

Third

Delaware, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and the
Virgin Islands

Twelve

Fourth Circuit

Maryland, North
Carolina, South
Carolina, Virginia, and
West Virginia

Eleven

Fifth Circuit

Louisiana, Mississippi,
and Texas

Sixteen

Sixth Circuit

Kentucky, Michigan,
Ohio and Tennessee

Fifteen

Seventh Circuit

Illinois, Indiana
and Wisconsin

Eleven

Eight Circuit

Arkansas, Iowa,
Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota
and South Dakota

Ten

Ninth Circuit

Alaska, Arizona,
California, Hawaii,
Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
Oregon, Washington,
Guam, and the Northern
Marina Islands

Twenty-Eight

Circuit
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UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
(ctd. )
CIRCUITS

GEOGRAPHICAL AREA

NUMBER OF JUDGES

Tenth Circuit

Colorado, Kansas, New
Mexico, Oklahoma,
Utah, and Wyoming

Ten

Eleventh Circuit

Alabama, Florida and
Georgia

Twelve

,

..

THE UNITED STATES COURT SYSTEM *
SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES

I
I

I

United States Court of Appeals
12 Circuits

United States Court 01 Appeals
lor the
Federal Circuit

I
I

Appeals trom Stale
Courts In SO States.
Irom tne Supreme
Court ot Puerto RIcO
ana (Ile Dlstrlcl ot
COlumbia Court 01
Ap:lea1s

United States
Tax Court
Court of
Veterans Appeals
and various
Administrative
Agencies
Federal Trade
Commission
National Labor
Relations Board
Immlgratlon and
Naturallutlon

I

I

United States
District Courts
with Federal and
Local Jurisdiction

Uniled States
District Courts
with Federal
Jurisdiction Only

Guam
Virgin Islands
Northern Mariana
Islands

.

I

I

89 Districts in
50 Stales
1 10 District 01

Columbia
1 In Puerto Rico

I
United States
Claims Court

I
United States
Court 01
International Trade

Administrative
Agencies
Merit Systems Board
Board 01 Contr _Cl
Appeals
Patenl! Trademark
Boards
Int'! Traae
CommisSion
Etc.

Service. etc.
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* Chart Obtained from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
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